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In 1989 Tasmanian media magnate Edmund Rouse at-
tempted to bribe a newly elected ALP member of par-
liament to support the minority government of then
Liberal Premier Robin Gray. Rouse’s naive and badly
planned attempt not only had ramifications for democ-
racy, but ultimately also for control of Tasmania’s ma-
jor media company, ENT Ltd. The last scenes in that
drama were played out recently when ownership of
ENT Ltd, the company Rouse had previously con-
trolled, passed to Bermuda-based media owner Bruce
Gordon. This paper looks at the emergence of ENT Ltd
as the major player in the Tasmanian media market un-
der Rouse’s stewardship, at his attempts to shore up
the company’s corporate interests through the bribery
attempt, and at the consequences thereof, namely the
dismantling of the state’s largest media empire.
FOR many years ENT Ltd was the dominant player inTasmanian media, with considerable interests in newspa-pers, television and radio. It has also owned or held inter-
ests in a number of non-media assets, and during the 1980s was
regarded as Tasmania’s largest non-resource group, with a mar-
ket capitalisation of around $120 million (Business Review Weekly
1989, p.160).
From 1951 until 1993 the company’s fortunes were closely
linked with those of its flamboyant former chairman and manag-
ing director, Edmund Rouse. Rouse became involved in the com-
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pany after marrying Dorothy Rolph, daughter of the company’s
then managing director, Sir Gordon Rolph. In the highly paro-
chial and regional Tasmanian media market, Rouse quickly de-
veloped a reputation for being outspoken and brash. It was an
image which he nurtured. For example, he is reputed to have
said when asked about his decision to drive a Rolls Royce, “I
bought it for its effect on pedestrians. In Launceston it makes
them spit; in Hobart they throw up” (Business Review Weekly
1989, p.160).
The company he joined had been in the Rolph family since
1897, when his wife’s grandfather, W.R. Rolph, purchased Tas-
mania’s oldest newspaper, the Launceston-based Examiner, in
partnership with A.T. Young (Shaw n.d.). When Young retired in
1916, Rolph formed a partnership with his son, Gordon, who
managed the newspaper until his death in 1959 (Shaw n.d.).
Edmund Rouse then took over as managing director.
Before Rouse assumed the helm of the company, its principal in-
terests had been in newspapers, mainly the Examiner. First printed
in 1842 by three Congregationalists — James Aikenhead, the Rev.
John West and J.S. Waddell — it was initially called the Launceston
Examiner and Commercial and Agricultural Advertiser (Australian Dic-
tionary of Biography 1968, p.3). The Examiner began life as a weekly,
although within six months it was printed twice weekly, with edi-
tions on Wednesday afternoon and Saturday (Cyclopedia of Tasma-
nia 1900, p.78). From 1853 it was published three times a week — on
Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday (Cyclopedia of Tasmania 1900). It
became a daily on December 21, 1877 (Examiner Jubilee Booklet 1892,
pp.13–14). The Examiner underwent a number of format changes
over the years, beginning as a small tabloid (measuring just 27cm
by 42cm). The page size was doubled in 1854 and in 1868 it became
a full broadsheet, although it reverted back to a tabloid format in
1948 (Lockwood 1980, p.78).
During the early years, the Examiner faced considerable oppo-
sition from other Launceston-based newspapers, including the
Telegraph, the Cornwall Chronicle and the Launceston Advertiser
(Morris-Miller 1953, pp.37–38). The Examiner absorbed the Ad-
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vertiser in 1847 and the Chronicle in 1880 (Morris-Miller 1953,
p.37). This set in place a competitive spirit which Edmund Rouse
was to further develop in later years.
Despite a number of changes in ownership, the Examiner con-
tinued to expand. In January 1872 the Weekly Examiner was intro-
duced. This was renamed the Tasmanian in 1881 when the
Examiner bought a publication of that same name and merged
the two weeklies (Morris-Miller 1953, p.37). The Tasmanian was
published until 1895. From 1901 to 1935 the Examiner published
the Weekly Courier, and for 60 years, from 1924 until 1984, the Sat-
urday Evening Express. The latter was replaced in August 1984 by
the Sunday Examiner (Tanner 1990, p.89). During the 1980s the
Examiner published a free weekly newspaper, the Tasmanian
Mail, which circulated statewide. The competitive nature of Tas-
mania’s newspaper market also saw the Examiner publish small
localised inserts which were directed at communities along the
edge of its prime circulation area. These were intended to stave
off competition from both the Hobart-based Mercury and the
north-west coast-based Advocate.
Under Rouse’s stewardship the company expanded quickly.
In 1959 the company was granted one of Tasmania’s two televi-
sion licences and formed Northern TV Ltd to run the new station
called TNT Channel 9, which began telecasting in Launceston in
May 1962 (ENT Ltd 1988, p.2). The granting of the television
licence and the formation of Northern TV Ltd marked the begin-
ning of the company’s diversification phase. In July 1965 North-
ern TV Ltd and the Examiner Newspaper Pty Ltd were merged
to become Examiner-Northern TV Ltd, now ENT Ltd (ENT 1988,
p.2).
Whilst developing its electronic media interests, ENT Ltd was
also keen to expand its Tasmanian newspaper holdings. Its tar-
get was the Burnie-based Advocate newspaper, owned by the
Harris family. For nearly a century, Tasmania’s media market
had been dominated by three families — the Davies family, own-
ers and publishers of the Mercury newspaper in the south; the
Rolph and Rouse families in the north, owners of the Examiner;
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and the Harris family in the north-west, owners of the Advocate.
The Davies family had controlled the Mercury from its establish-
ment in 1854 until 1986 when it was taken over by the Herald
and Weekly Times Group, later News Ltd. The Advocate was es-
tablished by the Harris family in 1890, although under the name
the Wellington Times and Mining and Agricultural Gazette.
Over the years competition between the three organisations
was fierce, with the Examiner and Mercury each trying to eat into
the Advocate‘s prime circulation areas — the Mercury along the
west coast and the Examiner along the north-west coast. How-
ever, neither was successful. In the Examiner‘s case, not even the
establishment of offices at Devonport and Burnie or the produc-
tion of a special replated north-west edition of the Examiner en-
abled it to make any significant inroads into Advocate readership.
This was due to the highly regionalised nature of Tasmania’s
newspaper market and the clear loyalties Tasmanians have to a
regional newspaper. For example, research conducted by the
Roy Morgan Research Centre found that the three newspapers
enjoyed virtual market saturation in their respective circulation
areas. This ranged from 75.3 per cent during the week for the
Mercury to 80.1 per cent for the Advocate and 89.2 per cent for the
Examiner (Morgan 1987, p.1–2). The Examiner enjoyed the highest
out-of-region readership, with 17.4 per cent circulation along the
north-west coast (Morgan 1987). It was on the basis of this re-
search and private polling undertaken by the Examiner that ENT
concentrated its efforts on the north-west coast.
ENT’s 1988 annual report described the company’s principal
activities as television, newspapers, radio, commercial printing,
motels, travel agencies, picture theatres, property development
and investment (ENT Ltd 1988, p.10). The 1980s certainly saw
ENT Ltd move further away from a dependence on newspapers
as its major source of income to a greater involvement in the elec-
tronic media. In 1982 ENT Ltd bought all the shares in Hobart’s
television station, TVT6 (ENT Ltd 1982), a move which was not
well-received in southern Tasmania, given the parochial rivalries
which existed between the two cities. These rivalries had their
origins in an 1804 decision to divide the then colony of Van
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Diemen’s Land into two separate counties, each under the au-
thority of a Lieutenant Governor; however, in the years since
they have been fuelled by the various media organisations (Tan-
ner 1990).
ENT continued its expansion in 1985 with the purchase of
Melbourne radio station 3UZ for $9.2 million, although it has
since sold the station (Examiner October 31, 1986, p.37). How-
ever, in 1988 the company underwent a major reconstruction. In
a somewhat surprising move, given its regional focus, ENT sold
Channel 9 in Launceston to comply with the federal govern-
ment’s regional television aggregation policy, but retained
Hobart station TVT6. ENT Ltd used the $40 million from the sale
of TNT9 towards the purchase of Associated Broadcasting Ser-
vices Ltd in Victoria for $76 million (ENT Ltd 1988, p.2). This
purchase gave ENT Ltd two new television stations — BTV6 in
Ballarat and GMV6 in the Goulbourn Valley, now known as VIC
TV — as well as a 40 per cent interest in Filmpac Holdings Ltd, a
distributor of motion picture programs and home videos in Aus-
tralia, South-East Asia and New Zealand (ENT Ltd 1988). It also
acquired two Victorian radio stations — 3SR and 3UL — with the
purchase but on-sold those for $9.5 million (ENT Ltd 1988, p.2.)
In July 1988 ENT Ltd acquired indirect control of six radio sta-
tions in the USA — four in California and two in Oregon. These
were added to the two Tasmanian radio stations it already
owned — 7EX in Launceston and 7HT in Hobart (ENT Ltd 1988,
p.5). During the year ENT Ltd gained control of miller and vehi-
cle distributor Holyman, Monds Affleck Ltd and, through that
acquisition, increased its holding in timber and hardware group
Gunns Kilndried Timber Industries Ltd (ENT Ltd 1988, p.11). In
May 1988 Australian Business rated ENT Ltd 55th among Austra-
lia’s top share market performers during the previous 10 years,
with its share price showing compound annual growth of 32.91
per cent (1988, p.62). By the end of 1988, the company’s expan-
sion interstate and overseas meant that ENT Ltd no longer relied
on its Tasmanian operations for profit. In fact, according to a re-
port presented to shareholders in December 1988, the company
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derived 58 per cent of its profit before interest and tax from its
mainland operations (ENT Ltd 1988b; Clarke 1989).
The bribery attempt
During the 1980s, Tasmanian politics were in a volatile state,
with the political agenda being dominated by the develop-
ment-versus-conservation debate. This was highlighted first by
the Gordon-below-Franklin dispute — a proposal to construct a
large hydro-electricity scheme in the south-west — and then by
the Wesley Vale dispute — a proposal to build a $1 billion pulp
and paper scheme on the north-west coast. Both projects were ul-
timately halted after enormous community pressure and the in-
tervention of the federal government.
Not only did these represent major defeats for the pro-devel-
opment Liberal government led by then Premier Robin Gray, but
they also provided a launching pad for the political careers of a
number of Green Independent politicians. The political career of
long-time Greens leader Dr Bob Brown had its genesis in the
Gordon-below-Franklin debate, and that of his successor, Chris-
tine Milne, in the Wesley Vale dispute. Not only that, but in a
state dominated by personality politics (Sharman 1977, p.15),
their popularity was such that they were able to bring other
lower-profile people into the parliament on their electoral coat
tails.
This was highlighted in the 1989 state election, which saw the
Liberal government of Robin Gray lose its majority in the 35-seat
House of Assembly, and five Green Independents win the bal-
ance of power. The Liberals were reduced to 17 seats, compared
with the Labor Party’s 13. During the election campaign, both
major parties had argued that in the event of a hung parliament
they would not negotiate with the Greens to give them govern-
ment.
Gray, who commanded the largest single block of seats after
the election, said he would form a minority government and al-
low it to be tested on the floor of the house. He also said that in
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the event of the ALP (which had suffered its worst electoral de-
feat since 1922) and the five Green Independents doing a deal to
form government, he would advise the Governor, General Sir
Phillip Bennett, to call a fresh election. Speculation that there
would be another election mounted when the Greens and the La-
bor Party hammered out an historic Accord. Gray had earlier re-
fused to discuss the possibility of forming a minority
government with the Independents and at the same time pub-
licly criticised the ALP for dishonouring a similar pledge which
it had made during the election campaign.
Gray believed that the government’s case for a fresh election
was a strong one. The government had sought opinions from a
number of prominent interstate QCs and the Attorney-General,
John Bennett, had follow-up meetings with them which sug-
gested that the Governor could accept such advice. However, the
Premier’s plans were thrown into disarray when news leaked
out that there had been an attempt to bribe a newly elected Bass
Labor MP, Jim Cox, to support his minority government if a
no-confidence motion was moved against it when parliament re-
sumed.1
The bribery attempt had been engineered by Edmund Rouse,
who had returned from an overseas trip shortly after the elec-
tion. Rouse, who later said that his decision was prompted by a
concern over the state of the Australian economy, and in particu-
lar the prospect of the Greens holding the balance of power in
Tasmania, arranged to meet Gray on two occasions over the
Queen’s Birthday long weekend in June 1989 (Royal Commis-
sion, transcripts of in-camera evidence 1991, pp.38-39). He later
told the Royal Commission set up to investigate the bribery at-
tempt that he had tried to convince Gray to offer Cox the
Speakership or a ministry to support his government (Royal
Commission, transcripts of in-camera evidence 1991, p. 49).
When Gray declined, believing that his party would not accept
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1. News of the bribery attempt broke on June 23, 1991. However, there had been ru-
mours of a proposed bribery attempt circulating in political circles for some
days before that.
such a solution, Rouse then embarked on his plan to bribe Cox
by offering him $110,000.
Rouse believed that of the Labor members of parliament, Cox
was the most likely to accept the bribe. He was aware that Cox, a
former radio announcer and DJ and a one-time ENT employee,
had recently separated from his wife and believed him to be in
some financial difficulties. Accordingly, he arranged for a sec-
ond former employee, Tony Aloi, a sales executive with 3UZ, to
telephone Cox at home and offer him the money. Aloi became in-
volved in the plan when he rang Rouse seeking work experience
for a friend. Rouse believed that Aloi would provide him with a
solution to his problem — that if Aloi would act as the mid-
dle-man then Rouse could remain at arm’s length. Having de-
cided to proceed with the bribery attempt, Rouse contacted Aloi
and asked him to meet him at Melbourne Airport, where he out-
lined the plan (Royal Commission, transcripts of evidence 1991,
p.184).
Aloi telephoned Cox, identified himself as “John Chrome”,
and offered him $110,000 over five years if he was prepared to
vote with the Liberals in defeating a no-confidence motion which
was expected to be moved against the government when parlia-
ment resumed.2 Cox immediately contacted Labor leader Mi-
chael Field and his deputy Peter Patmore, advising them of the
conversation. The first calls were dismissed as hoaxes, however,
when the first instalment of $5000 arrived at Cox’s home he con-
tacted police, who placed a tap on his telephone and also advised
him to cooperate with the caller. In return for the first instalment,
Cox was expected to telephone Gray and offer his support. Cox
rang the Premier’s home but was told by Gray’s son Ben that his
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2. There was some speculation in the media that the $110,000 represented the dif-
ference between a backbencher’s salary and that of a minister over the life of the
parliament. However, Rouse denied that, saying that it was a figure which he
believed would appeal to Cox, and one which he could afford. The payment
was to be in a number of instalments — $5000 as a show of faith, $5000 when Cox
contacted Gray, $25,000 when he supported the government in the expected
no-confidence motion and $25,000 a year for three years. See Royal Commis-
sion, transcripts of in-camera evidence 1991
father was on his way home from Sydney and would not be in
until later that night, June 23.
Aloi was arrested later that same night in a public telephone
box in Melbourne while talking to Cox (Lester 1989, p.1). He later
confessed to police that he had rung Cox on behalf of Edmund
Rouse. He said that he had done so because of his admiration for
Rouse, whose company ENT Ltd had previously owned 3UZ
(Royal Commission, transcripts of evidence 1991, p.181). How-
ever, as his later testimony to the Royal Commission established,
he did not appreciate the seriousness of his actions.
Rouse’s involvement in the bribery attempt was not publi-
cised in Tasmania for some days after Aloi’s arrest, despite spec-
ulation to that effect and a mainland radio news bulletin which
identified him as the businessman believed to be involved. The
rumours created a dilemma for ENT Ltd, inspired to a large de-
gree by concerns that the company’s right to hold broadcasting
licences would be reviewed in the event of a conviction against
Rouse (Report of the Royal Commission 1991, p.406).
ENT executives were reluctant to tackle Rouse on the question
of his involvement. According to David McQuestin, the manag-
ing director, they “wanted to think that it wasn’t correct” (Report
of the Royal Commission 1991, p.407). Nonetheless, they decided
that the Examiner and Tas TV “had to treat it as a normal story
and that there was to be no protection [for Rouse or his family,
given his position within the company]” (Report of the Royal Com-
mission 1991, p.498). That they did, with the Examiner‘s coverage
of the bribery affair, in particular, proving a good case study in
objective journalism. Rouse ultimately pleaded guilty to the
criminal charge of attempting to bribe Cox and was jailed for
three years (Tasmanian Criminal Code, s. 72). He was also fined
$4000 for improperly using his position as a company officer (s.
229 (4) of the Companies Tasmania Code) and barred from hold-
ing a company position for five years after his release from jail.
Aloi was sentenced to 12 months in jail, with eight months sus-
pended. The managing director of ENT, David McQuestin, was
also charged with attempting to obstruct the due course of jus-
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tice by concealing and destroying evidence, but these proceed-
ings were later discontinued by the DPP (Report of the Royal
Commission 1991, pp.47–73). Soon after being charged, Rouse re-
signed from the chairmanship of ENT Ltd, giving up control of
the company he had dominated for nearly 30 years. At that time,
however, the Rouse family maintained its 20 per cent share hold-
ing in ENT Ltd, making it one of the major shareholders.
Rather than end, as one would presume, with Rouse’s convic-
tion, the bribery affair developed a life of its own. When Robin
Gray heard of the attempt to bribe Cox, he abandoned plans to
petition the Governor for a fresh election. Instead, he handed the
Governor his resignation after his government was defeated in a
no-confidence motion when parliament resumed on June 28. The
incoming Labor government, believing that it could gain politi-
cal mileage out of the corruption issue, established a Royal Com-
mission to determine whether other people were aware of, or
involved in, the attempt to bribe Cox.
In particular, the government was keen to draw a link be-
tween Gray and Rouse. The latter was widely acknowledged as
having had direct influence over Tasmanian Premiers of both po-
litical persuasions. In this case the supposed connection was pro-
vided by the two meetings between Rouse and Gray over the
Queen’s Birthday weekend, especially a “particular coincidence
between the timing of the second meeting and the commence-
ment of Rouse’s attempt to bribe Cox”, and a $10,000 donation
Rouse had given Gray for the Liberal Party.3 Not surprisingly,
the Royal Commission wanted to know whether Rouse had told
Gray of his plans at either of the meetings.
This line of inquiry was followed because Gray, as leader of
the Liberal Party, was the man most likely to benefit if Cox did
cross the floor. The connection was never established, however,
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3. The $10,000 came from a safety deposit box which ENT used for contingencies. It
was this same box from which Rouse asked McQuestin to draw the $10,000 used
for the first two payments to Aloi. McQuestin was not aware of the purpose to
which the Aloi money was to be put and later asked Rouse to repay the money. The
existence of the security box and its contents were unknown to ENT’s other direc-
tors and became the subject of a Corporate Affairs investigation.
with both Rouse and Gray denying that the Premier was aware
of the bribery attempt. Even so, the Commissioner concluded
that the Premier had acted improperly in that he should have
suspected, if not known of, Rouse’s intentions following their
meetings (Report of the Royal Commission 1991, pp.768–769).
The Commissioner’s findings highlighted the naivety of
Rouse’s bungled bribery attempt. Evidence to the Royal Com-
mission confirmed that it was an ill-conceived plan. Neither
Rouse nor Aloi really thought out what would be said to Cox;
and Rouse indicated that he was keen for Gray to know that he
had had a part in Cox’s decision to support him if that eventu-
ated. Rouse also openly discussed with people the fact that there
was “a loose cannon on the deck of the Labor ship of state”,
while behind the scenes seeking to engineer such a result him-
self. Finally, he involved other people in his scheme — namely
Aloi; his secretary, who helped to wrap and send the money to
Aloi in Melbourne by overnight courier; and McQuestin, his
friend of 30 years. Each of these people ultimately suffered be-
cause of his arrogance.
There is no doubt too that Gray’s career suffered as a result of
the inquiry. Both the Commission and the media focused on the
fact that he had not passed the $10,000 ENT donation on to the
party’s treasurer, preferring to keep it in freezer bags at his
home. Gray’s explanation was that the party was not working
hard enough at fundraising for the first election, and that he had
earmarked the $10,000 for a second campaign if it were necessary
(Report of the Royal Commission 1991, pp.139–140). The parliamen-
tary Liberal Party obviously felt that Gray had been wounded by
the inquiry, because it subsequently dropped him as Opposition
leader, opting instead for his one-time deputy and now Premier,
Ray Groom. This didn’t appear to have any impact on the elec-
tors, however, with Gray topping the poll statewide at the elec-
tion which was called one month after he had been deposed as
Liberal leader, outpolling the next best vote winner, Groom, by
three votes to two. The real victim of the inquiry in a political
sense was Jim Cox who, despite his honesty, was defeated at the
next election. Although, even Gray’s reputation may have been
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scarred by the experience, for recent attempts by him to seek Lib-
eral Party endorsement for a switch to the federal arena have
been blocked.
The impact on ENT
Rouse’s arrest and eventual conviction had an immediate and
long-lasting impact on the company. The value of ENT shares
fell slightly at the time of his arrest. On June 23, 1989, the day on
which Aloi was arrested and Rouse’s possible involvement in
the bribery attempt was first mooted, ENT shares were sitting at
$4.00 (Pringle-Jones 1994). However, on June 28, the day he ap-
peared in court, they fell to $3.75 (Pringle-Jones). They stayed at
that price the following day, when Rouse’s resignation as chair-
man of ENT was announced. Rouse was eventually charged on
November 3, 1989, but pleaded not guilty. ENT shares continued
to fall in value. On April 30, 1990, the day he pleaded guilty, the
shares hit $2.55, recovering to $2.65 on May 7, the day he was
convicted (Pringle-Jones). By September 1991 the company’s
share price hit a low of 76 cents (ENT Ltd 1994, p.7).
Whether the fall in ENT shares can be attributed entirely to
Edmund Rouse’s fall from grace is a moot point. Whilst it ap-
pears that his actions and subsequent conviction did have some
impact on public perceptions of the company, it can also be ar-
gued that the decline in support for ENT was a reaction to the
company’s expansion program during the 1980s. ENT re-
sponded by embarking on a debt reduction and consolidation
program. In 1990, whilst Rouse was in jail, ENT Ltd sold the
company’s flagship, the Examiner newspaper, for $28 million to
John B. Fairfax’s Rural Press group (60 per cent) and Harris and
Co., owners of the Burnie Advocate (40 per cent). This sale sig-
nalled a major break with the company’s print media origins. Be-
tween 1990 and 1994 asset sales recouped almost $70 million
(ENT Ltd 1994, p.5). These included its local radio stations, 7EX
in Launceston and 7HT in Hobart ($1.8m), and its US radio inter-
ests ($4.3m). The timber industry interests which Rouse was try-
ing to protect in 1989 were sold for $9m (ENT Ltd 1994, p.5).
64 Australian Studies in Journalism
Certainly this appears to have had a positive impact on the com-
pany’s shares, with ENT’s share price having increased at a com-
pound rate of 30.2 per cent per annum over the past 3 years (ENT
Ltd 1994, p.7).
In its advice to shareholders, ENT said that it had managed to
reduce its net borrowings from $139 million at June 30, 1990 to
$48 million at June 30, 1994 (ENT Ltd 1994, p.7). Furthermore,
this was achieved despite the company having to spend $27 mil-
lion for aggregation in Victoria and Tasmania (ENT Ltd 1994,
p.5). Non-core assets had been reduced to $10.9 million, with
plans to dispose of them (ENT Ltd 1994: 5).
Whilst embarking on a sell-off of non-core assets, the com-
pany had also increased its television interests. It purchased STV
Mildura for $18 million in 1989, and a 20 per cent stake in Perth’s
Sunraysia Television in 1994. Directors pointed to the fact that
VIC TV was the highest-rating television network in Australia
and that its rating of 37.6 for the 15 weeks to July 30, 1994 placed
it more than five points ahead of most Nine Network metropoli-
tan stations (ENT Ltd 1994, p.6). They also pointed to the fact
that TAS TV had held the number one position in Tasmania since
aggregation, according to mid-year AGB McNair Anderson re-
sults, as further evidence to support their argument that the
takeover offer should be rejected (ENT Ltd 1994, p.6).
Until WIN’s successful takeover, ENT Ltd was essentially a
Tasmanian owned and operated company. Whilst its share regis-
ter included such major investors as AMP, National Mutual and
Commercial Union, it was controlled by Tasmanian sharehold-
ers. According to the company’s 1989 annual report, in February
that year local investors owned 20.15 million shares, represent-
ing 64.56 per cent of the voting capital. The largest single block of
shares was controlled by the Rouse family, with 6.885 million
shares (20.07 per cent of issued capital). By 1992 the Rouse fam-
ily’s share holding stood at 19.8 per cent, and was watered down
to 13.5 per cent when it decided against taking up a 1-for-3
renounceable rights issue. This put the family’s holding just under
the 15 per cent limit set by the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal.
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Shareholders with a 15 per cent holding in a company must make
an annual return to the ABT, which can then determine whether
they are fit and proper people to hold a licence or not. The impact of
the Rouse Bribery Royal Commission had previously been of con-
cern to the company in that regard. Under the rights issue, the fam-
ily had three options: it could have sold them, as it did; forfeited
them to the underwriters; or purchased them by August 10 for $2.8
million (Caples 1992).
In hindsight, the family’s decision not to take up the rights is-
sue and in the process to water down its own share holding
should probably have been regarded as a warning of its future
intentions. Ultimately, Edmund Rouse signalled those intentions
when he, his wife Dorothy, and their daughters sold 7 million
shares to WIN Television for $13 million, thereby providing the
trigger for the eventual takeover bid. Rouse said that the family
had decided to sell its shares because it no longer had any mana-
gerial input into how ENT was being run (Polonsky 1993b, p.1).
Although his son David was general manager of TAS TV in
Hobart, the family’s control of the company had been removed.
Rouse explained the decision in the following terms:
We decided to sell because it was a very considerable investment in one
lump, and an investment in which we had no managerial input at all.
That was too risky a situation to continue forever. We thought about it off
and on for a long time. Once the Examiner was sold it was certainly a lot
easier to come to a decision to sell. (Polonsky 1993b, p.1)
His wife Dorothy agreed that the sale of the Examiner, the flag-
ship of the media company controlled by her grandfather and fa-
ther respectively, had been a deciding factor (Polonsky 1993c,
p.10). The Rouse family’s decision to sell their shares marked the
end of a 96-year association with the company.
WIN’s takeover came as a surprise to ENT senior manage-
ment, given comments by WIN Television managing director
John Rushton at the time of the Rouse share sale that the com-
pany had no intentions of a full bid for ENT, saying that the
share holding was an investment (Clark 1993b). However, the
Mercury reported media analyst Bob Peters of ANZ Capel Court
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as saying that a takeover bid was likely. He pointed to the fact
that WIN television was wholly owned by Bruce Gordon and
suggested that Gordon was likely to move for full control of ENT
Ltd (Clark 1993b). Even so, ENT chairman John D’Arcy wel-
comed WIN’s share holding at the time of the Rouse sale, argu-
ing that it made sense for a fellow Nine affiliate which was
involved in regional television to hold a stake in the Tasmanian
company (Clark 1993a, p.2).
However, D’Arcy and the ENT board advised shareholders to
reject the WIN bid, arguing that it undervalued the company and
was “neither fair nor reasonable”. Directors argued that the ini-
tial offer of $1.55 a share was well below the price WIN had paid
for a strategic interest in the company when it purchased the
Rouse family share holding and did not include a premium for
control and ownership of ENT (ENT Ltd 1994, p.1). They also ar-
gued that it was well below the valuation of $2.04 to $2.23 a share
put on the company by Potter Warburg and Co. (ENT Ltd 1994,
p.1). The revised offer at $1.68 a share valued ENT at $105 mil-
lion, but was still below the market high point of $2.05 during
the preceding 12 months (ENT Ltd 1994, p.1). Despite the board’s
efforts, WIN was able to increase its holding to 91 per cent when
the major institutional investors sold out, thereby pushing it over
the threshold required to compulsorily acquire the remaining
shares. If those final shares are purchased, Rushton has indicated
that ENT will probably be delisted. He also indicated that the
company’s corporate headquarters would probably be trans-
ferred to Wollongong, where WIN Television’s headquarters
were situated (Standen 1994, p.4).
Conclusion
It is that fact which spells the end of an important era in
Tasmanian media ownership, one which might not have oc-
curred but for Edmund Rouse’s decision in 1989 to try to bribe a
newly elected member of parliament, and an outcome which he
certainly would not have foreseen at that time. That Rouse had
considered such action necessary and achievable was a sad in-
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dictment of his attitude to the use of media power to influence
the democratic processes. It was an action with potentially wide-
spread ramifications, which could reflect both on the democratic
processes of government and the media’s role therein.
Rouse’s decision had the potential to further undermine com-
munity attitudes towards politicians, political institutions and
the media. As a number of recent public opinion polls have
shown, all have credibility problems.4 However, Rouse’s actions,
in a media context, do need to be clarified. His intention was
never that his actions be associated with ENT; that is, they were
the actions of a private citizen, rather than of the chairman of a
multi-million dollar company, difficult though it may be to sepa-
rate the two. That was reflected by his intention to reimburse the
company for the $10,000 and to pay the $100,000 out of his own
resources. Admittedly, he was keen for Robin Gray to know that
his was the guiding hand behind Jim Cox’s decision to defect.
And this points to the naive, almost farcical nature of the whole
bribery attempt. It also points to the arrogance of the man. On
the one hand he wanted to remain at arms length, hence his deci-
sion to use Aloi as an intermediary. On the other hand, he
wanted Gray to know that he was working to secure the govern-
ment’s fortunes. Furthermore, he was prepared to talk about a
“loose cannon” while undertaking to prise that cannon loose
himself through illegal means. In the process, his actions im-
pacted directly and indirectly on a number of other, innocent
people, and for that alone he should probably be condemned.
Edmund Rouse’s conviction, the subsequent sale of the Exam-
iner and the takeover of ENT Ltd brought to an end the second
phase in the move away from family-based media empires in
Tasmania which began more than a decade earlier with the end
of the Davies family’s involvement in the Mercury and its even-
tual takeover by the Herald and Weekly Times Group. In some
respects it could be argued that the trend began when the federal
government moved to limit the ownership of regional television
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4. See, for example, Morgan Research Centre Report No. 2577, 1994 which com-
pares the honesty and integrity of politicians with other professions. Attitudes
towards journalists have been widely documented.
licences, a decision which forced ENT Ltd to sell one of its two
Tasmanian stations.
On a personal note, it undermined the tremendous contribu-
tion which Rouse had made to the Australian media industry
over many years, through his involvement with the Newspaper
Advertising Bureau, the Australian Press Council, the Regional
Dailies Association and the Media Council of Australia. It also
undermined the major contribution Rouse had made to Tasma-
nia over the same period.
On a lighter note, it also marked the end of a tradition which
Rouse had set in train during his time as ENT chairman. Each
Christmas, Rouse, in his own inimitable way, would walk
through the Examiner news room in Launceston and present the
staff with their annual bonus — an all-day sucker lollypop. Such
was his sense of humour.
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